Routine by Daniel S. Hamermesh









Prepared for the Conference of the International Network on the Economics of Time Use, St. Gerlach, The
Netherlands, May 26-27, 2003.  Edward Everett Hale Centennial professor of economics, University of Texas
at Austin; research associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, and research fellow, Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA).  I thank Namkhee Ahn, Eli Berman, Anders Klevmarken, Jay Stewart and
participants at the Pre-Conference and at several universities for helpful comments, and Abe Dunn and Elaine
Zimmerman for assistance.  The National Science Foundation supported the research underlying this study
under Grant SES-9904699.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Daniel S. Hamermesh.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including . notice, is given to the source.Routine
Daniel S. Hamermesh
NBER Working Paper No. 9440
January 2003
JEL No. J22, J12
ABSTRACT
Routine— maintaining the same schedule from day to day— saves time. It is also boring and
inherently undesirable. As such, the amount of routine a person engages in is partly an economic
outcome, with variations in routine generated by variations in the price of time, household income
and the ability to generate variety. Using time-budget data from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands
and the United States, I show that men engage in more routine behavior than women, but only
because they spend more time in (routine) market work. Other things equal, more educated people
engage in less routine behavior, while higher household incomes enable people to purchase more
temporal variety. Spouses’’ temporal routines are highly complementary. The positive income
effects and impacts of schooling indicate yet another avenue by which standard measures of
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The unabridged dictionary defines routine as, “a customary or regular course of 
procedure.”  The notion of regularity is explicitly temporal in terms both of when an activity 
occurs and its repetition at that same time over several time periods. The biopsychological 
evidence for temporally routine behavior is immense.  We know (see Moore-Ede et al, 1982) that 
both plant and animal organisms have natural circadian rhythms, although (absent any visual or 
aural cues) these are by no means naturally 24-hour rhythms for most organisms.  Natural cues 
turn species-specific rhythms into 24-hour rhythms; and among social species the evidence 
suggests that individuals’ actions reinforce the behavior of other members of the same species to 
generate more commonality among members than would arise if each operated in vacuo (Wever, 
1982).  Social interactions generate externalities in the timing of activities and market work (e.g., 
Weiss, 1996). 
While biological forces and natural cues no doubt affect behavior, it is difficult to believe 
that these fully determine humans’ day-to-day timing of their activities.  Rather, “routine” is 
almost certainly an activity that involves individual choice, and as such it is an economic activity: 
It forces its practitioner to forego something (temporal variety) that may be desirable, and it 
presumably enhances utility, either directly or because it is productive (enables the worker to earn 
more and thus eventually consume more, or to economize on the quantity of time used in 
consumption).  As such, it should differ from one person to another depending on their different 
abilities and incentives to engage in routine activities.  It should thus be amenable to economic 
analysis like any other activity that affects incentives to consume and produce. 
As with other interpersonal differences in consumption, variations in the timing of 
economic activities across days affect individuals’ welfare.  Deducing interpersonal differences in 
well being simply by examining how much people consume, or even when their consumption 
occurs (as did Hamermesh, 1999a, in studying the timing of work), provides an incomplete 
picture of those differences. Economic welfare also depends on the desirability of routine/variety   2
and on the correlations of its consumption with other components of individuals’ full income.  
Thus examining the determinants of routine/variety contributes to a broader understanding of the 
distribution of economic returns. 
By routine I mean temporal routine—doing the same thing in each of at least two time 
periods at the same time.
1  I do not address routine defined in terms of variations in the kinds of 
commodities produced in the household across time periods (but see Gronau and Hamermesh, 
2001).  The focus is exclusively on the similarities or differences in when an activity occurs 
during at least two different periods of time. While studies of what and how much people 
consume are ubiquitous, the literature on when they consume is almost nonexistent. The 
empirical analysis here opens this area of study of human behavior by presenting some new tests 
of the role of economic incentives in individuals’ use of time.  It also provides evidence on how 
the externalities generated within a marriage affect the behavior of husbands and wives. 
In Section II I derive a theory of the demand for temporal routine.  The essence of the 
idea is that routine is useful, in that it enables people to economize on the set-up costs of 
consumption and production, but that (at the margin) it is undesirable, since it restricts people’s 
ability to enjoy temporal variety.  Section III outlines the general ways in which we move from 
theory to the empirical analysis of time budgets, and it presents the details of the underlying data 
sets.  Section IV generates tests of the theory and information on demographic patterns of 
interpersonal differences in routine in the four countries whose time budgets I use. 
II.  A Model of Demand for Temporal Variety 
Temporal variety is the opposite of routine.  It is expressed in people’s behavior as 
engaging in a particular activity at different times on different days.  I assume that consumers find 
temporal variety desirable at the margin, although I later examine how the results are affected if 
                                                           
1The only study of which I am aware that even measures the extent of intertemporal similarity of activity 
(and that only for transport) is Rindsfüser (2001).   3
this assumption is incorrect at least up to some margin and consumers have positive preferences 
for at least some routine behavior. 
We can capture the essence of the demand for variety by a model that postulates two 
commodities, two days and two time periods of fixed length per day.  The consumer’s utility is 
determined by the amounts of these commodities that she consumes and by the temporal variety 
inherent in the timing of her consumption.  Her utility is: 
(1)  U = U(Z
A, Z
B) + R(V) , 
Ui >0, Uii <0, and Ui  Y 4 as Z
i  Y 0.  The Z
i are commodities that must be consumed on each day 
in time slot 1 or time slot 2.  Both the (nonzero) amounts of the commodities and the timing of 
their consumption on each day are subject to choice.   
The consumer’s satisfaction is enhanced when she produces more of the two 
commodities and when the commodities are produced at different times on the two days.  That 
temporal variety (of a fixed quantity to be consumed) is utility-enhancing is not clear a priori, 
although it seems reasonable:  If it were not, the costs of generating variety would ensure that 
everyone produced each commodity at exactly the same time each day.  Given these assumptions, 
temporal variety is completely captured in this simple model by: 
(2)  V = A11[1 - A21], 
where the indicator Ajk = 1 if commodity i is consumed on day j in time slot k, j, k=1,2, Ajk = 0 
otherwise.  I assume that R(1) > R(0) = 0. 
  Production of the commodities Z
i proceeds by the individual combining goods X
i that are 
purchased in the market at prices p
i and the time available in the time slot k.  Since the slots are of 
fixed length, we ignore them here (but relax this assumption below).  If the consumption of Z
i is 
routine—is done at the same time each day—all the time in the slot can be devoted to its 
production.  If, however, Z
i is produced at different times on different days (if V=1), some time 
that would otherwise be devoted to producing more of the commodity must instead be spent in 
planning the production/consumption activity.  Routine is productive, in that it enables the   4
producer/consumer to mechanize decisions about when and how to engage in each activity, thus 




i - 8iV, 8i> 0, 
where 8i measures the commodity-specific cost of producing variety, assumed for now to be the 
same for all individuals. 
  The consumer maximizes U subject to the constraint that her entire income, wH+I, is 
spent on the X
i, where w is her wage, H her (fixed) daily hours of work, and I her unearned 
income.  This yields the following maximizing conditions: 
(4)        U1(X
A - 8AV, X
B - 8BV)/U2(X
A - 8AV, X
B - 8BV) = pA/pB  
with V = 1 if: 
(5)        ) = R(1) - [U(X
A, X
B) - U(X
A - 8A, X
B - 8B)] > 0 . 
Variety imposes lumpy costs on the production of commodities.  The producer/consumer follows 
the usual criteria for allocating income between commodities, setting the marginal rate of 
substitution between them equal to the price ratio.  She adds to this standard condition an extra 
consideration based on the utility derived from variety and on the relative sizes of the gains to 
variety and the fixed costs imposed when the commodities are not produced as part of a routine. 
The equilibrium is interesting only as it is affected by shocks to the exogenous variables 
that determine it.  Since the entire budget must be spent, as wH+I increases the 
producer/consumer is buying more of the X
i and producing more of the Z
i.  Under the 
assumptions about the shape of U this additional spending guarantees that above some level of 
income the producer/consumer maximizes utility by setting V = 1, jumping from completely 
routine to completely temporally variable behavior in this two-period model and perhaps 
discretely changing the relative production/consumption of the two commodities.  At some point   5
the bracketed term in (5) drops below R(1):  The fixed costs of variety are overcome by the 
contribution of variety to utility. This inference leads to the empirical prediction: 
P1: Higher-income people produce/consume in a less routine fashion than do 
otherwise identical individuals with lower incomes. 
  The model thus far treats the creation of variety as generating a fixed time cost 
independent of the amounts of the commodities that are produced.  It also defines the total real 
time devoted to producing/consuming each commodity as fixed by technology independent of the 
quantities produced.  We can relax those assumptions, putting the model directly into the Becker 
(1965) framework of producing commodities of differing relative goods intensities.  This 
reformulation allows the costs of variety to rise with the production of the commodities.  




i [ti + 8iV] ; X
i = aiZ
i , 
where ti is the time intensity of commodity i, ai is its goods intensity, and T
i is the total amount of 
time devoted to producing i each day.  Here variety imposes costs that rise with the amounts of 
the commodities that are produced.  Because the daily amount of time that is devoted to 
producing commodity i is now subject to choice, V can no longer be defined as in (2).  Instead, 
we define V=1 if the specific hours used to produce commodity i on Day 1 differ from the hours 
devoted to its production on Day 2, and V=0 if they are identical.  (This is clearly also a 
restrictive assumption, since one could imagine a continuum of variety ranging from 1, if there is 
no overlap across days in the timing of producing commodity i, to 0, if the overlap is complete.) 
  Using the definitions of the household production technologies in (6), and assuming that 
individuals devote all their time (outside of the fixed hours of work) and income to the 
production/consumption of the two commodities, utility in (1) is maximized when: 
(4’)        U1/U2 = {pAaA+ w[tA + 8AV]}/{pBaB+ w[tB + 8BV]}  
with V = 1 if:   6




B)V=1] > 0 . 
Under the assumptions about the Uii a higher total income (wH+I) generates the same negative 
effect on the likelihood of routine here as in the simpler model that treated variety as imposing a 
fixed cost.  Possibly offsetting this tendency toward less routine will be the greater opportunity 
cost of deviating from routine as the price of time rises, other things equal.  The net effect of a 
higher wage rate on the demand for variety is thus ambiguous. 
  The discussion thus far implicitly treats hours of work as fixed on each of the two days.  
The choice between routine and variety is exercised over the hours of the day that remain after 
hours of market work (which are assumed to be identical in amount and timing on both days).  An 
expanded version of the second model would include market work as an additional, completely 
time-intensive commodity that, like all other commodities, rises in price (actually, generates a 
decline in the hourly wage) if routine is abandoned for the pleasures of variety.  This minor 
extension yields the same results for market work as for home-produced commodities.  People 
with higher full incomes are less likely to engage in routine behavior in their timing of work.  The 
effect of higher wages for a given full income will be indeterminate because of the possibly 
offsetting effects of greater demand for variety and the higher costs of variety generated as the 
wage rate rises. 
An interesting extension comes when we allow market work to be one of the 
commodities and recognize that the equilibrium wage for workers with a given set of skills is 
determined in the labor market by the actions of employers and workers. The evidence on 
compensating wage differentials for jobs that workers report as being repetitious is mixed 
(Brown, 1980).  If, however, we assume that workers prefer variety but that the workplace is 
more productive if it is operated routinely, a compensating wage differential will be paid to 
workers on repetitive (routine) jobs.  Since routine is inferior, we will observe lower full-income 
workers seeking the routine jobs that offer this pay differential.  Accounting for both sides of the   7
labor market thus reinforces the inference that routine behavior will be observed more frequently 
among lower full-income workers. 
This discussion has proceeded as if there was a single decision-maker choosing activities 
and generating routine/variety in order to maximize his/her satisfaction.  The model generates 
some potentially interesting additional components if we try to apply it to the behavior of a 
married couple.  We know that couples time their leisure together (Hamermesh, 2002; Hallberg, 
2002, Ch. 3); but how does the timing of their routines interact?  In a unitary household model 
(see Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, for a discussion of household models) the decision-maker 
(whose identity is undefined) must take into account the effect of one spouse’s routine on the 
labor-market and non-market productivity of the other spouse. One might expect that the 
household technology would allow routine behavior by one spouse to reduce the cost of 
household production by the other spouse.  A husband’s routine generates a positive externality 
for his wife, and vice-versa.  That being the case, the cost to a couple of one spouse foregoing 
routine for the pleasure of variety is higher than it would be for a single individual, because of the 
spillovers to the other spouse’s time use (assuming they wish to be together).  Even in a collective 
model, in which each spouse maximizes his/her utility by striking a (cooperative or 
uncooperative) bargain, this externality raises the value of the bargain and makes it more likely 
that the couple engages in simultaneous routine behavior.  This yields: 
P2:  The routine of spouses will be complementary.  
I have assumed thus far that 8i, the cost of generating temporal variety in commodity i, is 
the same for each consumer/producer.  This is unlikely to be the case.  Just as there is evidence 
(Gronau and Hamermesh, 2001) that additional human capital aids individuals in overcoming the 
fixed costs of increasing the numbers of commodities they produce in the household, so too 
should human capital enable them to overcome the set-up costs of changing their timing of 
consumption.  This could be modeled by making V in (2) a decreasing function of the amount of 
human capital embodied in the consumer/producer, implying that additional skill lowers the cost   8
of generating variety, thus generating a positive correlation between human capital and variety 
and yielding the proposition: 
P3:  The demand for variety will rise with human capital (education). 
One might reasonably object that the impact of additional human capital on the cost of 
variety is difficult to distinguish from a positive correlation between the taste for variety and the 
ability to accumulate additional human capital.  In the empirical sections I deal with this concern 
in part both by replicating the results on several different data sets and adjusting for as many 
observable differences as are available, recognizing that this cannot wholly distinguish between 
the two explanations. 
  This discussion has been based on the assumption that routine is uniformly undesirable 
(that R’>0 throughout).  If this assumption is incorrect, and R’ is initially negative and only 
becomes positive after some degree of routine is achieved, the predictions do not change so long 
as the point at which R’ switches sign comes at a sufficiently low value of its argument.  If R’ is 
uniformly negative, so that people enjoy routine at the margin throughout, that plus the 
productivity of routine mean that we will never observe people varying the timing of their 
production/consumption across days.  That we in fact do observe diurnal variety in the timing of 
household production suggests that this latter possibility is inconsistent with behavior. 
III.  Testing and Data 
The difficulty in implementing the theory lies in defining what we mean by routine. First, 
we are limited by the data in the potentially usable surveys, since time budgets report on 
individuals’ timing of consumption over at most seven days, and typically just two days.  Thus 
the simple archetype used to derive the results in Section II is in fact fairly close to what the data 
permit empirically. 
A second, more severe problem is that typically at least 80 different activities are coded 
in the time budgets.  Reporting and coding errors will guarantee that temporal variety apparently 
exists when in fact different names may be given to the same activity.  This imposes the   9
requirement that we use a fairly high degree of aggregation of activities in order to define routine 
in a way that might approximate how the consumer thinks of it.  Because the classification of 
activities differs in the various data sets I use, this also means that the extent of aggregation 
necessary to make the aggregates comparable across the data sets will differ. 
Finally, the data require that we define routine/repetitive activity in terms of the time 
units over which the budgets are collected.  The time units into which the days are disaggregated 
may be 5 or 15 minutes long.  This difference too will affect the extent to which the time budgets 
reflect the existence of temporally routine behavior.  All of these considerations dictate that the 
empirical work cannot be based just on one set of data.  Rather, in order to obtain a believable set 
of estimates of the extent and determinants of routine behavior, I base the empirical work on four 
sets of time budgets, those from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. 
  The Australian Time Use Survey of 1992 (ABS, 1993) is a random stratified sample of 
roughly 7000 individuals on two days each, with only 1 percent of those who completed a diary 
on one day failing to provide two days of diary information.  The days on which diaries were kept 
were typically successive, so that the hebdomadal distribution of observations is nearly uniform 
(so that 4/7 of the sample kept diaries for two weekdays, and 1/7 kept diaries for two weekend 
days).  Individuals were asked to list when they began each new activity, and their responses were 
then coded into 280 separate categories of activities.  The activities could encompass as few as 5 
minutes, with the upper bound on the length of an activity being the full 24 hours.  In addition to 
the individuals’ time diaries one person in each household responded to an interview survey 
detailing the household’s characteristics.  I use all respondents age 18-69 who completed two 
weekday time diaries or two weekend time diaries. 
 The  1991-92  German  Zeitbudgeterhebung (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999) covered both 
West and East Germany and was structured quite similarly to the Australian survey.  It allowed 
for 230 possible activities, and it disaggregated time units into five-minute intervals.  The sample 
is slightly larger than the Australian sample.  Essentially no one failed to fill out diaries for both   10
days.  Because the survey was undertaken very shortly after the German reunification, I use only 
observations from the former West Germany.  Both it and the Australian survey obtained 
information from both husbands and wives, allowing me to examine the role of intrahousehold 
complementarity in the demand for routine.  The analysis is based on all respondents age 20-69 
who completed two weekday or two weekend time diaries. 
 The  Dutch  Tijdbestedingsonderzoek (NIWI, 1993) is a quinquennnial cross-section time-
budget study that has been conducted since 1970.  In this analysis I use the survey conducted in 
October 1990, in which 3415 individuals completed usable diaries of their activities.  The survey 
divided respondents into two roughly equal groups, with individuals in one half-sample 
completing diaries for seven consecutive days (Sunday through Saturday) in one week, and the 
other half-sample doing so in the second week.
2   Each individual’s activities were coded into 
quarter-hours of the previous day.  The range of possible activities encompasses 203 separate 
usable categories.  In the Dutch data I use observations on all individuals age 18-69.   
Finally, I also use the United States the 1975-76 Time Use Study, which obtained four 
days of time diaries kept by 1519 households.  The days were at three-month intervals, with two 
being weekdays, one a Saturday and the fourth a Sunday, and they were coded into 15-minute 
intervals.  This is the only available American data set that has information on more than one 
diary day, and that thus allows the calculation of measures of temporal routine.  Unfortunately, 
the sample is very old, quite small and insufficient for many of the analyses.  Data for weekend 
routine (the weekday data proved to have too many observations with partially missing 
schedules) are included mainly to provide comparisons to the results from other countries. 
  In order to ensure some degree of comparability across the four data sets, for each 
country I aggregated the basic activities into the following twelve main categories, denoted by A 
                                                           
2For half the sample the Sunday included the day when the Netherlands went off summer time.  Thus for 
those individuals on that day there were 1500 total minutes, a difference I account for in all the following 
empirical work using this sample.   The effect on human activity of this temporary relaxation of the time 
constraint is analyzed in Hamermesh (2002). 
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(activity):  Market work; cleaning and cooking; family and child care; shopping; eating; sleeping; 
other personal activities; schooling and training; organized activities; sports and leisure; radio and 
television; and reading and writing.  For each of the twelve activities and each of the 288 (96 for 
the United States) time slots t in a day, I create the indicator variable: 
(7) It = 1 if   ADt = AD’t , 0 otherwise, 
where D and D’ are the two days on which the person’s activities are observed.  Then for 
Australia and Germany I define the measure of temporal routine as: 
(8) ROUTINE  =  ∑It/288 , 
thus scaling the measure so that for each person in the samples: 1 ≥ ROUTINE ≥ 0.  For the 
United States the definition is the same, except the denominator in (8) is 96. The Australian and 
German time budgets also contain information on the respondent’s secondary activities in each 
time slot.  This allows the creation of an expanded measure of routine, ROUTINE’, that considers 
a time slot as being used routinely either if It = 1 or if the same secondary activity (among the 
twelve categories) is performed at time t.  Since only a small fraction of time slots are coded as 
having a secondary activity in the Australian data this extension is unimportant there.  While 
many of the time slots in the German data do list a secondary activity, this extension makes little 
difference there either. 
  The existence of time diaries for seven days makes computing the extent of routine for 
the Netherlands more difficult.  There are ten pairs of weekdays for each respondent.  For each 
pair of days D and D’ I calculate: 
(8’) ROUTINEDD’ = ∑It/96, 
and 
(8”) ROUTINEWKDAY = ∑ROUTINEDD’/10 . 
Thus for weekdays in this sample ROUTINE defines the extent of temporal routine as the average 
across all possible pairs of weekdays.  Since there is information on both Saturday and Sunday 
activities for each respondent, ROUTINE on weekends is calculated as in (7) and (8) (except with   12
96 as the divisor).  Because the Dutch time budgets contain no information on secondary 
activities, there is no way to calculate ROUTINE’. 
  Although the theory in Section II has implications for the kinds of commodities 
produced, examining the determinants of both temporal and quantitative variety jointly is beyond 
the scope of this study.  Recognizing their relationship, however, in estimating the demand for 
temporal variety, I adjust for the extent of quantitative variety.  In unreported variants of the 
estimates I included for each respondent a measure of the number of different basic activities in 
which he/she engaged on the days used to calculate ROUTINE, with results that differed little 
from those presented in the text. 
Proposition P3 requires constructing a measure of human capital, which I obtain for each 
data set using information on the respondent’s educational attainment.  The information is 
indicated by years of schooling or by the level of schooling (and in Germany apprenticeship too) 
attained.  To make the data sets comparable, for each country I divided the respondents into three 
educational categories, with the sizes of the low-, middle- and high-education groups varying 
across the samples. For each country I inferred the appropriate aggregations from conversations 
with people who were familiar with the country’s educational system.
3 
  The central demographic information is on marital status and numbers and ages of 
children.  While I present summary statistics on routine for all demographic groups, the relatively  
small number of single persons requires that most of the analysis has to be confined to the 
determinants of routine by married individuals.  Information on the ages of children (and even the 
                                                           
3I thank Damien Eldridge for information on Australia, John Haisken-De New for West Germany and 
Gerard Pfann for the Netherlands.  For Australia education is low if secondary or no qualifications, middle 
if a certificate, diploma or trade qualified, high if a bachelor's degree.  The distribution among married men 
(women) is:  38 (58) percent, 46 (33) percent and 16 (9) percent.  For West Germany education is based on 
sums of years of schooling and formal training.  The distribution is:  41 (47) percent, 23 (30) percent and 
36 (23) percent. For the Netherlands education is low if lower general or vocational/technical, middle if 
middle or high general or vocational/technical, high if academic.  The distribution is:  35 (42) percent, 37 
(32) percent and 28 (26) percent.  For the U.S. education is low if less than high school, middle if high 
school, high if more than high school. The distribution is 31 (26) percent, 30 (45) percent and 39 (29) 
percent. 
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definition of child—in the Australian data children are defined to be under age 15) is not 
comparable across countries.  In the analysis I categorize the age of the youngest child using the 
definitions provided by the individual data sets, but in the discussion I refer to the categories as 
pre-school, pre-teen or teen. 
  A variety of external forces might constrain the ability to generate variety.  Perhaps the 
most important is the existence of market work that is provided on a fixed daily schedule.  Since 
the theory does not include the presence of external constraints, a proper test of the hypotheses in 
Section II requires accounting for hours of market work.  Accordingly, I form two measures, 
WORKDAY, the average hours of market work (including transportation to and from the 
workplace) spent on a weekday, and WORKEND, average hours of market work on a weekend 
day, and include these in all regressions describing ROUTINE. 
  To obtain measures of income effects in the demand for routine we need a pure measure 
of income untainted by wage effects.  This is, of course, difficult to obtain.  As the best 
alternative I thus use measures of spouse’s total income and estimate the demand for routine only 
for married persons.  The Dutch time budgets have no usable information on spouse’s income, 
since all the data pertain to individuals.  By linking household records for married couples in the 
Australian and German data, however, I can construct measures of spouse’s income in each.  In 
both data sets these measures include all income accruing to the spouse—both his/her earnings 
and any unearned income.  In addition, for couples with two working spouses, both below age 60, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that most of each working spouse’s income consists of earnings.  
Thus for subsamples of the Australian and German data with both spouses under age 60 and 
working in the labor market I also estimate the determinants of routine including the respondent’s 
own income divided by hours of work, a proxy for the price of his/her time.  Although the 
measures of time prices are imperfect, including them, spouse’s income and human capital 
endowments allows some hope of sorting out the separate effects of income, prices and household 
productivity on the production of and demand for temporal variety.   14
  Table 1 presents estimates of the means and standard deviations of ROUTINE for each of 
the four data sets for respondents categorized by sex and marital status.  Most encouragingly, the 
amount of routine calculated in this way differs very little across the four countries within each 
sex/marital status class.  The differences in the number of underlying activities and in the 
minimum duration in which they can be recorded do not appear to have generated major 
international differences in the calculated outcomes. 
Note first the fraction of time at which the same activity is repeated on both days:  Even 
on weekends, roughly half of the day is accounted for by activities (among the twelve) that are 
repeated intertemporally simultaneously.  Also, note the importance of the constraints imposed by 
fixed work schedules:  For each of the three countries on which we have usable weekday and 
weekend data, and for each sex and marital status, there is less temporally routine consumption 
on the weekend (more interday variation) than on weekdays.  Market work to some extent 
regulates the degree to which we can substitute intertemporally among activities.  Not 
surprisingly, because of their greater labor-force attachment on weekdays men have more routine 
schedules than women with the same marital status.  On weekends, however, this difference 
breaks down completely:  With no obligation to report to (typically fixed-schedule) workplaces, 
men’s demand for routine differs little from that of women of the same marital status. 
IV.  Estimates of the Determinants of Routine 
A.  Results on Human Capital, Income, Time Prices and Spouses’ Interactions 
In much of what follows I concentrate on the data for Australia and Germany, since those 
data sets contain many more observations than the others and because the time intervals and 
activity categories are coded more finely.  Table 2 thus presents the summary regressions 
characterizing these data sets and pooling all the available observations.  In each regression here 
and in subsequent tables I include indicators for each day of the week to account for the 
possibility that the extent of routine might vary independently among pairs of days (for example, 
Monday-Tuesday versus Wednesday-Thursday).  Perhaps the strongest (and absolutely   15
unsurprising result) is the tremendously significant positive effect of additional hours of market 
work on routine.  Each additional hour of market work raises the fraction of the day that is 
routinized by between 0.02 to 0.04.  Since each hour accounts for 0.042 of a day, this result 
means that each marginal hour worked might reduce temporal variety by as much as one-for-one.  
Alternatively, however, it implies that, while market work does generate additional routine, the 
fraction of a worker’s day outside work that is routinized might decrease by as much as 30 
minutes for each additional hour of market work each day. 
One might interpret the influence of age and education in these equations as reflecting the 
respondents’ human capital.  We cannot tell from these equations (but see below) whether the 
effects are due to the role of higher incomes or greater efficiency in household production (in the 
production of temporal variety). The estimated impacts of both sets of variables do, however, 
imply that people with more human capital generate greater temporal variety.
4  While the effect 
of age is not significant in Australia, it is in Germany and implies that the extent of routine 
diminishes until age 38 and rises thereafter.  The estimated impacts of differences in educational 
attainment suggest that individuals in the lowest third of each country’s educational distribution 
enjoy between 35 and 50 minutes less variety each day than their compatriots in the upper third of 
the distribution working the same number of hours in the market. 
Differences in hours of market work (and the rigidities imposed on schedules) and human 
capital account for most of the demographic differences that appeared in the means in Table 1.  
The coefficients on the demographic variables in Table 2 are typically insignificantly different 
from zero and imply that having additional children, or having pre-school children, does little to 
alter the extent of temporal routine.  Differences by sex and marital status also disappear once we 
account for market activities and human capital. 
                                                           
4The effect shown in the table is net of the impact of educational attainment on market work.  If we exclude 
hours of market work from the equations, however, the gross effects of education remain positive and are 
generally significant statistically.   16
Table 3 presents estimates like those in Table 2, but for weekday and weekend routine 
separately and for the Netherlands and the United States as well as for Australia and West 
Germany.  While there are some differences in the coefficients between weekdays and weekends, 
the central results in Table 2 are duplicated for both types of days.  Except for Australia, the 
human capital measures look quite similar (although, because the sample sizes are smaller, less 
significant statistically) on weekends as on weekdays.  Individuals with more human capital 
generate more temporal variety on weekends than do those who have less education and who are 
at the extremes of the ages in the sample (18 and 69).  Since market work is rare on weekends 
(except in the U. S.), so that the price of time is unlikely to be a major issue, the presence of 
educational differences in the extent of temporal routine on weekends suggests the importance of 
the role of human capital in reducing the λi in equation (3).   
The conclusion that much, but perhaps not all of an extra hour of market work increases 
the extent of temporal routine is consistent with the results for weekdays for each of the three 
samples.  Similarly, the presence of additional children has little effect on temporal routine either 
on weekdays or weekends; but having pre-schoolers increases the amount of variety experienced 
over a pair of weekend days, although it has no impact on variety over pairs of weekdays.  As in 
Table 2 there are no consistent differences by sex and marital status in the extent of temporal 
variety, except that single males are significantly more likely than their married brethren to have 
more routine schedules, other things (including hours of market work) equal. 
Throughout the rest of this study I concentrate on married persons (in some cases on 
married couples), thus reducing sample sizes slightly but allowing interpretation of the results 
independent of marriage decisions.  The results are presented separately for men and women to 
examine whether the impacts of the human capital and other variables differ by sex.  Tables 4a 
and 4b thus present the same results as Table 3, but for married men and women separately.  The 
most striking finding is the remarkable similarity by sex in the responses to the determinants of 
routine.  Only on the most precisely estimated effect, that of hours of market work on weekdays,   17
is there a consistent and statistically significant difference by sex (with an extra hour of market 
work increasing the temporal routine of husbands more than that of wives).  The negative impacts 
of additional human capital on routine are roughly the same by sex; and the presence of young 
children, and of additional children have statistically similar small and inconsistent effects on 
both mothers and fathers.
5 
While the results on the impact of additional human capital are provocative, the 
correlation of educational attainment with the price of time means that they do not allow us to 
infer whether they stem from differences in household productivity (or even tastes) or differences 
in opportunity cost.  Also, the correlation between one spouse’s educational attainment and the 
other’s, and thus the other’s income, ensures that we cannot be certain that the estimated impact 
of own schooling is not reflecting income effects.  To account for this latter possibility I 
reestimate the equations describing the production of routine for Australians and Germans, 
separately by weekdays and weekends, including measures of one’s spouse’s income in each 
equation (weekly income in Australia, monthly income in Germany).   
The estimates for weekdays are shown in the first, third, fifth and seventh columns of 
Table 5a, while those for weekends are presented in Table 5b.  Spouse’s income is generally 
negatively correlated with the amount of temporal routine an individual produces.  As the theory 
in Section II predicts, a rise in spouse’s income generates a pure positive income effect on the 
demand for variety, holding constant an individual’s ability to produce variety (proxied by age 
and educational attainment).  (Here I assume that spouse’s income can be treated as I—ignoring, 
since the data do not permit addressing the issue, the possibility that spouse’s income could also 
reflect cross-wage effects.)  Also worth noting is that the estimated positive impacts of additional 
education on the production of temporal variety shown in Tables 4 are not greatly altered by the 
inclusion of this proxy for other household income. 
                                                           
5All of the regressions were reestimated using ln(ROUTINE) as the dependent variable, with no 
qualitatively important changes in any of the results. 
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A complete, albeit imperfect accounting for human capital, other income and the price of 
the respondent’s time is presented for working couples under age 60 in Australia and Germany on 
weekdays in the second, fourth, sixth and eighth columns of Table 5a.  Even with sample sizes 
reduced by a factor of nearly three, the general conclusions from the rest of this table, and from 
the earlier tables remain.  Additional education generally increases the amount of temporal 
variety produced.  With both other income and a measure of the price of one’s time included, this 
is strong evidence for the role of human capital in increasing the efficiency of household 
production.  Also, as in the other columns of this Table, additional spouse’s income increases the 
temporal variety of one’s activities, consistent with the theory in Section II.  The new variable—
the respondent’s own income per hour—has a negative impact on variety in Australia, consistent 
with the time cost of departures from routine being less important than the income effects 
generated by higher earnings at a given hours worked in the market.  The results for Germany are 
exactly opposite:  The impact of higher own income per hour is positive, implying that the cost of 
generating temporal variety exceeds the income effect of higher earnings.
6   
In Section II I noted that a person’s production of routine generates an externality on 
her/his spouse.  The issue is whether, other things equal, one spouse’s choice of temporal routine 
is related to (and, as predicted, complementary with) the other spouse’s.  To examine this 
question I reestimated the models in Tables 4a and 4b (pooling weekday and weekend routine) 
for all three countries where spouses could be identified in the data set (thus excluding the 
Netherlands).  The purpose is solely to see whether one’s spouse’s human capital and, most 
important, idiosyncratic temporal routine affect the other spouse’s temporal routine. 
The estimates that include spouse’s characteristics are shown in Table 6.  I focus on 
educational attainment and spouse’s routine to save space.
7  The first result is that spouse’s 
                                                           
6One could readily speculate about why we observe this stark and significant difference across the two 
countries, but I shall forego the pleasure. 
 
7In other specifications I also included the measures of spouse’s income that were included in Tables 5a 
and 5b.  The conclusion for Germany and Australia that there are positive income effects on the demand for   19
education has effects that are generally in the same directions as one’s own education.  Having a 
more educated spouse raises the amount of temporal variety that one generates.  Whether this 
reflects complementarities in the ability to lower the cost of producing variety or correlated tastes 
for variety cannot be inferred from these results.  The more striking and highly significant result 
is that idiosyncratic increases in one spouse’s production of temporal variety generate increases in 
the other spouse’s temporal variety.  The effects are substantial, indicating that each extra hour of 
variety generated idiosyncratically by one spouse leads the other to produce between 11 and 23 
minutes of additional variety.  Spouses’ time use is complementary over time as well as at a point 
in time.   
The complementarity of spouses’ time is not symmetric, however:  The effect of the 
wife’s variety on the husband’s is significantly greater than the effect of his production of variety 
on hers.  Routine in men’s daily schedules is always more strongly affected by idiosyncratic 
variation in their wives’ routine than the opposite, even after adjusting for rigidities imposed by 
schedules of market work.  The asymmetry remains if we restrict the estimates in Table 6 to 
working couples only, or to couples in which the wife does not work, or if we delete measures of 
hours of market work.  This result parallels the finding in Hamermesh (2002) that the elasticity of 
spouses’ time together is higher with respect to increases in a wife’s earnings than to an increase 
in her husband’s earnings.  One interpretation is that wives have a greater preference for 
temporally coordinating their activities with their husbands than vice-versa. 
B.  Tests of Robustness 
Two of the main empirical results of this study are the complementarity of spouses’ 
production of temporal variety and the role of human capital in increasing the ability to generate 
temporal variety.  One might wonder whether the former result is merely an artifact of assortative 
mating along the dimension of education.  To examine this possibility I took the German data and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
temporal variety is not altered when the variables that are included in Table 6 to measure the spouse’s other 
characteristics are added to the regressions. 
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created random couples.  Each husband was matched randomly to a wife in the sample who is 
within a +/- five-year age range of him.  Similarly, artificial husbands were matched to each wife 
by choosing randomly from among husbands within a +/- five-year age range of her.  Unlike in 
Table 6, where at least for the women their husband’s education had a substantial positive effect 
on the amount of temporal variety they generate, in these matched data the random spouse’s 
educational attainment had no impact on the production of variety.  Also, variations in the 
random spouse’s idiosyncratic routine were unrelated to variations in the respondent’s.  The 
complementarities demonstrated by the results in Table 6 do not arise from some general 
commonality of behavior among husbands and wives in the same age group. 
I have examined temporal routine in all twelve aggregates of activities in the definitions 
of ROUTINE in (8) and (8”).  It is difficult to believe, however, that individuals care about 
generating temporal variety in all these activities equally, or that the costs of generating variety 
are the same for all twelve.  Variety in pure leisure activities may yield greater utility than 
temporal variety in timing market and homework, and that variety may also be more costly to 
produce.  To examine this possibility I generate measures of ROUTINE that account for 
increasingly wide definitions of the activities over which the extent of temporal variety is 
measured. The narrowest measure includes only organized activities, sports and leisure, radio and 
television, and reading and writing—presumably those pure leisure activities that represent 
consumption rather than partly physical maintenance.   A broader measure adds eating and other 
personal activities (bathing, washing up, sex, etc.) to this narrow measure, while a still broader 
definition of routine adds sleep time.  If the results on the impact of market work and human 
capital are correct, these variables should affect the amount of temporal variety generated even in 
these subaggregates. 
The first three rows of each panel in Table 7a present the results of reestimating the basic 
equation for German husbands and wives on weekdays, while the first three rows in each panel of 
Table 7b presents analogous results for weekends.  Comparing the estimates to those in Tables 4,   21
even for routine defined only over purely leisure activities individuals with more education are 
able to generate more temporal variety than their less educated fellows.  Indeed, the most 
important thing to note is that for all three definitions of routine the effects of education are 
generally similar to those in the earlier tables.  The finding that more educated people generate 
more temporal variety is not an artifact of the broad definition of activities—it holds even for 
those that can be defined narrowly as leisure. 
The significant negative effects of additional hours of market work on temporal routine 
may seem inconsistent with the positive effects shown in the previous subsection.  They are not.  
As in the earlier results, they indicate that an additional hour of market work leads to less than 
another hour of routine.  That additional temporal variety occurs in all the non-work activities that 
people undertake, but particularly in pure leisure activities:  Note that the effects in Table 7a on 
routine defined only over pure leisure are half as big as those on routine defined to include also 
eating, other personal activities and sleep, even though pure leisure activities account for only 31 
percent of the time in this broader aggregate.  While additional hours of market work create 
routine, workers compensate for it by increasing variety in those activities that are most like 
consumption and least like maintenance. 
Yet another concern is that the estimated effects of additional human capital on temporal 
variety might be biased because of a difference in the precision with which respondents in 
different education groups complete the time diaries.  To examine this possibility I redefine 
ROUTINE in (8) so that an activity is counted as ROUTINE if it was performed on the second 
day within 15 minutes of the time it was performed on the first day.  The results of reestimating 
the basic equations for married persons in Germany using this “fuzzy” definition of ROUTINE 
are shown in the bottom row of each panel in Tables 7a and 7b.  The results can be compared to 
those for Germany on weekdays and weekends in Tables 4a and 4b.  They are clear:  In all four 
cases the fraction of the variance described by the (same set of) independent variables is greater 
when we define routine precisely rather than “fuzzily.”  Moreover, in all cases the estimated   22
impact of low education is more positive and statistically significant, and that of high education 
more negative and significant in Tables 4a and 4b than in these estimates.  The implied positive 
effect of additional education on temporal variety is not an artifact of the precision with which 
routine has been defined. 
The Dutch data allow me to perform one additional test for robustness.  One might 
reasonably be concerned that there are a number of unobservable characteristics that determine 
each individual’s demand for temporal variety, and that these are correlated with some of the 
observable characteristics included in the models (particularly the measures of education).  So 
long as the impacts of unobservable characteristics are identical across pairs of weekdays and the 
weekend day pair, I can use the Dutch data to eliminate them.  Form the dependent variable: 
(9)  ∆ROUTINE = ROUTINEWKDAY – ROUTINEWKEND , 
where ROUTINEWKDAY is defined in (8”), and ROUTINEWKEND is the amount of routine 
generated across Saturday and Sunday (defined as in (8), but with a denominator of 96).  The 
variables used to describe variations in ∆ROUTINE are those included for the Netherlands in 
Tables 4a and 4b.
8 
Table 8 shows the results of estimating the determinants of ∆ROUTINE for the 
Netherlands, essentially eliminating the fixed effects that might cause some respondents to 
generate always a greater or lesser amount of temporal routine.  Differencing across pairs of day-
pairs does not alter the central conclusion about the role of human capital in generating temporal 
variety.  Similarly, describing weekend routine by weekday routine and the control variables (and 
thus not constraining the coefficient on weekend routine to be one) does not alter the conclusions.  
Here, as in the estimates for the Netherlands in Tables 4, men and women with lower educational 
attainment produce less temporal variety in their schedules than do otherwise identical men and 
women with more schooling. 
                                                           
8The estimated coefficients are not just differences of the estimated coefficients there, since the 
determinants of ∆ROUTINE include market work on both weekdays and weekends, while each of those 
tables included only work on the relevant days.    23
V.  Conclusions—the Nature of Routine 
  Evidence presented here for four countries leads to series of conclusions about the 
determinants of temporal variety.  In decreasing order of confidence, they are:  1) More educated 
people generate more temporal variety, other things equal.  The effect of educational attainment 
may result from the ability of more educated people to overcome the costs of generating variety.  
2) The presence of children, even young children, has little effect on temporal variety.  3) 
Additional income generated by one’s spouse increases the amount of temporal variety one 
enjoys.  This result indicates that temporal variety is a superior good.  4) The routine of spouses is 
complementary.  5) Higher earnings capacity, conditional on educational attainment, yields 
ambiguous effects on variety.  This ambiguity is consistent with the role of higher time prices in 
producing higher full incomes, which increases the amount of variety produced, and in raising the 
costs of generating variety, which decreases it. 
  The gross effect of additional schooling is to increase the amount of temporal variety.  
Since the estimates are uniformly consistent with the inference that variety is a superior good, this 
effect and the positive correlation of education and income suggest that measures of inequality 
that focus only on incomes ignore a component of well being that, like incomes, is correlated with 
education.  Unlike job-related nonpecuniary benefits (Hamermesh, 1999b), since we cannot 
explicitly value temporal variety we cannot infer whether the income elasticity of demand for 
temporal variety is greater than unity. Thus while we cannot deduce the impact of accounting for 
this correlation on standard inequality measures, the results do imply that temporal variety 
increases higher-income households’ well being more in absolute terms than income measures 
alone would indicate. 
 When we do things matters—for our individual well being, for the level of economic 
development, for the functioning of a household and for social cohesion.  No doubt many of the 
determinants of when activities are undertaken are biological.  As this study has shown, however, 
at least one aspect of “when”—temporal variety—is partly generated by economic decision-  24
making.  No doubt others are as well; and an interesting research undertaking would be to 
examine the relative importance of economic incentives in other decisions about timing as 
compared to the examination here and to their role in outcomes that are conventionally viewed as 
being more narrowly economic in nature.   25
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1982. Table 1.  Means, Standard Deviations and Number of Observations for Routine, by 
Country, Demographics and Sample 
 
   
Country Time  of 
Week 








                
Australia               
 Weekdays  .604    .654  .643    .554  .577 
   (.179)    (.183)  (.189)    (.154)  (.173) 
   3172    965  538    1081  588 
                
 Weekends  .483    .495  .464    .479  .482 
   (.146)    (.158)  (.172)    (.120)  (.146) 
   788    250  117    265  156 
Germany                
 Weekdays  .619    .673  .647    .564  .602 
   (.154)    (.154)  (.174)    (.128)  (.152) 
   4907    1819  529    1861  698 
                
 Weekends  .484    .474  .499    .493  .476 
   (.118)    (.122)  (.131)    (.108)  (.121) 
   1042    381  120    384  157 
Netherlands                
 Weekdays  .587    .635  .615    .560  .560 
   (.122)    (.133)  (.143)    (.099)  (.110) 
   2943    853  303    1302  485 
                
 Weekends  .458    .453  .454    .463  .456 
   (.122)    (.124)  (.141)    (.112)  (.132) 
   2943    853  303    1302  485 
United States                
 Weekends  .422    .409  .447    .432  .412 
   (.125)    (.134)  (.146)    (.113)  (.120) 
   782    281  65    321  115 Table 2.  Least-squares Estimates of the Determinants of Routine 
 
       Australia           Germany 
    
Age -.00057  -.00450 
 (-0.52)  (-4.75) 
    
Age
2/100 .0023 .0059 
 (1.77)  (5.56) 
    
Education:    
  Low  .0129  .0233 
 (2.81)  (6.25) 
    
  High  -.0131  -.0107 
 (-1.89)  (-2.74) 
Youngest child:     
  Less Than 6    -.00618 
   (-0.86) 
          0-1  .00077   
 (0.06)   
    
         2-4  .0100   
 (0.83)   
         
         5-9  -.00196   
 (-0.17)   
    
      10-14  -.00933   
 (-.098)   
       6-18    .00118 
   (0.19) 
    
No. Children  -.00747  -.00459 
 (-1.80)  (-1.59) 
    
Male .0134  .0108 
 (1.88)  (1.63) 
    
Married -.00426  .0108 
 (-0.65)  (2.18) 
    
Male* Married  -.00309  -.00649 
 (-0.35)  (-0.90) 
    
Market work week-  .0375  .0345 
days (hours)  (24.72)  (29.54) 
    
Market work  week-  .0268  .0195 
end (hours)  (8.94)  (7.38) 
    
N   5482  7902 
    
Adj. R
2  .282 .374 
NOTE:  t-statistics in parentheses here and in Tables 3-8.  Each equation also includes indicator variables for the days 
of the week that are included. Table 3.  The Determinants of Routine with Weekdays and Weekends Separated 
 
 
           Australia          Germany      Netherlands    United States 
  Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend   Weekend 
            
Age  -.0035 -.0001 -.0060   .0005 -.0044 -.0028    -.0079 
  (-2.61) (-0.04) (-5.33) (  0.22) (-3.98) (-2.12)    (-3.28) 
            
Age
2/100 .0058  .00263  .0071  .0010  .0065  .0042    .0098 
  (3.65) (0.82) (5.62) (0.42) (5.17) (2.86)    (3.51) 
            
Education:           
Low  .0174 .0075 .0281 .0184 .0391 .0046    .0216 
  (3.11) (0.66) (6.36) (2.04) (8.73) (0.87)    (1.73) 
            
High  -.0191 .0030 -.0146 -.0054  -.0146  -.0121    -.0034 
  (-2.32) (0.17) (-3.14) (-0.57)  (-3.03)  (-2.13)    (-0.34) 
            
Youngest  Child:            
Less Than 6      -.0127  -.0393  .0042  -.0194     
     (-1.47)  (-2.38)  (0.69)  (-2.67)     
            
             0-1  .0075  -.0293            -.0332 
 (0.53)  (-0.91)            (-1.68) 
            
            2-4  .0144  -.0370            -.0117 
 (1.02)  (-1.05)            (-0.61) 
                     
            5-9  .0045  .0018            -.0196 
 (0.33)    (0.06)            (-0.97) 
            
         10-14  .0012  -.0111            -.0028 
 (0.10)  (-0.46)            (-0.15) 
            
          6-12          -.0024  .0006     
       (-0.40)  (0.09)     
            
         13-17          -.0042  -.0074     
       (-0.58)  (-0.87)     
            
          6-18      -.0025  -.0309          
     (-0.35)  (-2.01)           
            
No.  Children  -.0081 .0064 -.0048 .0042 .0067 .0015    .0046 
  (-1.64) (0.58) (-1.39) (0.57) (2.31) (0.44)    (0.88) 
            
Male  .0148 -.0168 .0156 .0294 .0251 .0143    .0461 
  (1.72) (-0.93) (2.14) (2.06) (2.89) (0.14)    (2.36) 
            
Married  .0006 -.0221 .0181 .0117 .0242 .0036    .0376 
  (0.08) (-1.35) (3.03) (0.97) (4.03) (0.51)    (2.66) 
            
Male*Married  -.0126 .0227 -.0066 -.0478  -.0356  -.0093    -.0679 
  (-1.16) (1.02) (-0.76) (-2.86)  (-3.61)  (-0.81)    (-3.08)             
Market  work  week-  .0678  .0568  .0500      
days  (hours)  (37.73)  (41.53)  (32.47)      
            
Market work week-     .0083    -.0013    -.0258    -.0091 
end  (hours)    (1.52)    (-0.30)    (-1.08)    (-1.93) 
            
N  3155  781  4907  1042  2667  2667       782 
            
Adj. R
2  .386 .066 .370 .062 .367 .072        .042 
            
NOTE:  The equations for Australia here and in subsequent tables also include indicators of:  Immigrant status, foreign 




          Australia      Germany      Netherlands 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
          
Age  -.0027 -.0022 -.0006 -.0026  -.00665  -.0027 
  (-0.80) (-0.93) (-0.20) (-1.25) (-2.57) (-1.51) 
        
Age
2/100  .0052 .0032 .0021 .0036 .0097 .0039 
  (1.42) (1.21) (0.71) (1.62) (3.41) (1.91) 
        
Education:       
Low  .0144 .0235 .0227 .0202 .0364 .0346 
  (1.36) (2.83) (2.89) (3.23) (4.30) (5.70) 
        
High  -.0212 -.0077 -.0188 -.0240 -.0076 -.0167 
  (-1.53) (-0.56) (-2.34) (-3.33) (-0.84) (-2.41) 
        
Youngest  Child:        
Less  Than  6      .0128 -.0228 .0040 -.0049 
      (0.85) (-1.69) (0.34) (-0.57) 
        
              0-1  .0018  -.0009         
  (0.07)  (-0.04)      
        
             2-4  .0110  .0004         
  (0.45)  (0.02)      
                
             5-9  .0021  -.0111         
  (0.09)  (-0.58)      
        
          10-14  .0085  -.0146         
  (0.44)  (-0.93)      
        
           6-12          .0079  -.0047 
       (0.69)  (-0.60) 
        
          13-17          .0052  -.0120 
       (0.39)  (-1.30) 
        
           6-18      .00627  -.010     
     (0.51)  (-0.94)    
        
No.  Children  -.0052 -.0115 -.0076 -.0054 -.0036 .0056 
  (-0.64) (-1.74) (-1.42) (-1.11) (-0.60) (1.36) 
        
Market  work    .0705 .0643 .0605 .0443 .0675 .0372 
(hours)  (21.21) (20.55)  (25.9)  (18.25) (22.21) (12.54) 
        
N  965 1081  1819  1861 821 1265 
        
Adj. R




        Australia      Germany      Netherlands 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
        
Age  -.0009 .0088  -.0024 -.0002 -.0034 -.0018 
  (-0.13) (1.94)  (-0.45) (-0.04) (-1.21) (-0.85) 
        
Age
2/100  .0046 -.0084 .0047 .0018 .0051 .0033 
  (0.62) (-1.61) (0.87) (0.38) (1.65) (1.37) 
        
Education:       
Low  -.0040 .0064  .0537  .0036 -.0004 .0115 
  (-0.19) (0.39)  (3.47)  (0.28) (-0.05) (1.61) 
        
High  .0235 -.0476  .0293  -.0198 -.0059 -.0140 
  (0.80) (-1.71)  (1.86)  (-1.23) (-0.58) (-1.74) 
        
Youngest  Child:        
Less Than 6      -.0480  -.0317  -.0089  -.0197 
      (-1.64) (-1.18) (-0.68) (-2.02) 
        
              0-1  -.0578  -.0387         
  (-1.07)  (-1.00)      
        
              2-4  -.0399  -.0546         
  (-0.65)  (-1.29)      
                 
              5-9  .0208  -.0504         
  (0.42)  (-1.41)      
        
           10-14  -.0265  -.0361         
  (-0.67)  (-1.24)      
        
            6-12          .0041  .0043 
         (0.32)  (0.46) 
        
           13-17          .0023  -.0076 
         (0.15)  (-0.69) 
        
            6-18      -.0407  -.0111     
     (-1.59)  (-0.47)    
        
No.  Children  .0098 .0063  .0139  .0004 -.0038 .0022 
  (0.53) (0.49)  (1.20)  (0.04) (-0.58) (0.45) 
        
Market work   .0300  -.0207  -.0039  -.0049  -.0495  -.0412 
(hours)  (3.82) (-1.83) (-0.60) (-0.53) (-8.00) (-5.83) 
        
N  250 265 381 384 821  1265 
        
Adj. R
2  .134 .140 .080 .055 .130 .072 Table 5a.  Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Routine of Married Persons:  




  Australia Germany 
  Male Female  Male  Female 
               








               
Age  -.0037  -.0016  -.0029 .0028  -.0009 -.0043  -.0014 .0027 
  (-1.02)  (-0.18)  (-1.13) (0.41)  (-0.31) (-0.69)  (-0.64) (0.48) 
              
Age
2/100  .0065  .0039  .0038  -.0444  .0023  .0058      .0024  -.0032 
  (1.66)  (0.36)  (1.32) (-0.49)  (0.77) (0.83)  (1.03) (-0.48) 
              
Education:              
Low  .0122  .0259  .0216 .0457  .023 .0244  .0157 .0056 
  (1.09)  (1.35)  (2.46) (3.04)  (2.90) (1.98)  (2.46) (0.50) 
              
High  -.0140    .0011  -.0039 -.0008  -.0184 -.0114  -.0189 -.0207 
  (-0.93)  (0.05)  (-0.26) (-0.04)  (-2.25) (-0.89)  (-2.55) (-1.68) 
              
Market  work    .0730  .0400  .0628 .0373  .0605 .0364  .0427 .0286 
(hours)  (20.33)  (12.98) (18.36) (15.49)  (25.56) (16.44)  (17.14) (16.19) 
              
Spouse’s      -.0068  .00053  -.0014 .00092  -.0060 -.0073  -.0057 -.0043 
Income  (000)  (-1.20)  (0.06)  (-0.35) (0.12)  (-1.85) (-1.41)  (-3.73) (-1.50) 
              
Own  Income/    -.0026   -.0005   .00013   .00017 
Work  Hour    (-1.97)   (-0.65)   (2.17)   (4.25) 
              
N  883  356  988 324  1773 665  1815 667 
              
Adj. R
2  .369  .359  .363 .534  .316 .341  .228 .370 
               





 Table 5b.  Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Routine of Married Persons – 
Weekends Only with Spouse’s Income  
 
 
         Australia          Germany 
  Male Female Male  Female 
        
Age -.0025  .0078    -.0023  .0020 
 (-0.35)  (1.65)  (-0.41)  (0.44) 
        
Age
2/100 .0060  -.0073  .00501  -.0006 
 (0.78)  (-1.37)  (0.87)  (-0.12) 
        
Education:        
Low -.0079  .0058  .0489  .0006 
 (-0.36)  (0.33)  (3.09)  (0.05) 
        
High .0246  -.0395  .0250  -.0177 
 (0.77)  (-1.38)  (1.56)  (-1.09) 
        
Market work   .0327  -.0183  -.0034  -.0061 
(hours) (4.14)  (-1.54)  (-0.51)  (-0.64) 
        
Spouse’s    -.0298  -.0100  .0060  -.0050 
Income (000)  (-2.54)  (-1.22)  (1.16)  (-1.80) 
        
N 231  244  368  375 
        
Adj. R



















 Table 6.  Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Routine of Married Persons -- 
Including Spouse’s Characteristics 
 
 
  Australia   Germany   United  States 
 Male  Female    Male  Female    Male  Female 
                
Education:              
Low  .0145  .0132     .0113  .0098     .0154    .0257 
  (1.66)  (1.83)     (1.76)   (1.96)     (0.34)    (0.72) 
               
High  .0016  .0003    -.0063  -.0107      .0347    .0197 
  (0.13)  (0.02)    (-0.92)  (-1.81)      (1.07)    (0.67) 
               
Spouse’s                
 Education:                 
  Low  .0143  -.0092    -.0008   .0121      .0650   .0092 
  (1.61)  (-1.29)    (-0.14)   (2.24)      (1.33)   (0.26) 
               
   High  -.0123  -.0269    -.0028  -.0064      -.0116  -.0115 
 (-0.79)  (-2.65)    (-0.40)  (-1.12)      (-0.35)  (-0.40) 
                
  Routine    .328   .213      .351   .252      .386   .187 
  (10.71)  (10.66)     (16.47)  (16.72)     (2.93)  (2.44) 
               
N   1541  1541      2827     2891      102     118 
               
Adj. R
2    .397   .314      .522     .296      .132     .095 
               
NOTE:  Table 6 includes all the controls in Tables 4 plus the spouse’s: Age, age-squared, and hours of weekday and 



























 Table 7a.  The Determinants of Alternative Definitions of Routine:  Married Germans, 
Weekdays  
 







     Age    Age²/100  Education:  
    Low 
Education: 
    High 
Market  work   
(hours) 
Adj. R² 
              
Pure leisure  .0012  -.0007  .0012 .0058 -.0071  -.0156 .202 
  (0.90)  (-0.62)  (0.97) (1.77) (-2.10) (-15.94)   
              
Plus eating,  -.0013  -.0008  .0017 .0068 -.0087  -.0157 .203 
 other personal  (-0.88)  (-0.64)  (1.20) (1.86) (-2.29) (-14.34)   
              
Plus sleep  -.0034  -.0005  .0020 .0083 -.0089  -.0317 .316 
  (-1.62)  (-0.29)  (1.07) (1.63) (-1.70) (-20.93)   
              
              
              
“Fuzzy”    -.0038  -.0016  .0034 .0208 -.0139  .0530 .246 
  Routine  (-1.13)  (-0.55)  (1.09)  (2.52)  (-1.65)  (21.65)   
              
 
 







     Age    Age²/100  Education:  
    Low 
Education: 
    High 
Market  work   
(hours) 
Adj. R² 
              
Pure leisure  -.0080  -.0029  .0031 .0092 .0004  -.0108  .111 
 (-1.14)  (-2.87)  (2.92)  (3.14)  (0.14)  (-9.45)   
              
Plus eating,  -.0011  -.0033  .0041 .0086 -.0002 -.0113  .133 
 other personal  (-1.49)  (-3.00)  (3.46) (2.70) (-0.06) (-9.06)   
              
Plus sleep  -.0029  -.0069  .0082 .0141 .0029  -.0222  .210 
 (-2.78)  (-4.63)  (5.21)  (3.28)  (0.57)  (-13.19)   
              
              
              
“Fuzzy” -.0059  -.0014  .0025  .0104  -.0135  .0288  .114 
  Routine  (-3.62)  (-0.58)  (1.01)  (1.53)  (-1.69)  (10.83)   
              



















 Table 7b.  The Determinants of Alternative Definitions of Routine:  Married Germans, 
Weekends  
 







     Age    Age²/100  Education:  
    Low 
Education: 
    High 
Market work 
(hours) 
Adj.  R² 
              
Pure leisure  -.0006  -.0048  .0060 .0205 .0007  -.0190 .104 
 (-0.18)  (-1.31)  (1.60)  (2.01)  (0.07)  (-4.43)   
              
Plus eating,  -.0004  -.0052  .0066 .0248 .0079  -.0193 .123 
 other personal  (-0.11)  (-1.39)  (1.75) (2.41) (0.76)  (-4.45)   
              
Plus sleep  .0015  -.0039  .0064 .0321 .0109  -.0488 .237 
 (0.34)  (-0.76)  (1.23)  (2.28)  (0.77)  (-8.25)   
              
              
              
“Fuzzy” .0071  -.0036  .0069  .0471  .0314  -.0118  .075 
  Routine  (1.28)  (-0.59)  (1.10)  (2.76)  (1.83)  (-1.66)   
              
 
 







     Age    Age²/100  Education:  
    Low 
Education: 
    High 
Market work 
(hours) 
 Adj. R² 
              
Pure leisure  .0018  -.0069  .0079 .0104 -.0137 -.0190 .063 
 (0.95)  (-2.19)  (2.36)  (1.19)  (-1.25)  (-2.97)   
              
Plus eating,  .0017  -.0063  .0074 .0103 -.0142 -.0217 .083 
 other personal  (0.88)  (-1.93)  (2.17) (1.15) (-1.26) (-3.27)   
              
Plus sleep  -.0023  -.0007  .0015 .0005 -.0206 -.0552 .167 
 (-0.96)  (-0.17)  (0.35)  (0.04)  (-1.47)  (-6.72)   
              
              
              
“Fuzzy” -.0052  .0006  .0013  -.0061  -.0138  -.0217  .047 
  Routine  (-1.72)  (0.11)  (0.25)  (-0.43)  (-0.78)  (-2.14)   




















Table 8.  The Determinants of the Difference Between Weekday and Weekend Routine of 
Married Persons, the Netherlands  
 
 
 Male  Female 
    
Age -.0041  -.0012 
 (-1.21)  (-0.50) 
    
Age
2/100 .0054  .0012 
 (1.44)  (0.44) 
    
Education:   
Low .0352  .0242 
 (3.14)  (3.09) 
    
High -.0098  -.0083 
 (-0.82)  (-0.93) 
    
Youngest Child:     
    
          6-12  -.0017  -.0065 
 (-0.11)  (-0.64) 
    
         13-17  .0034  -.0011 
 (0.19)  (-0.09) 
    
No. Children  .0031  .0043 
 (0.40)  (0.82) 
    
Market work week-   .0710  .0522 
days (hours)  (17.53)  (13.10) 
    
Market work week-   .0040  -.0120 
end (hours)  (0.55)  (-1.49) 
    
N 821  1265 
    
Adj. R
2  .373 .146 
NOTE:  Table 8 includes all the controls for the Netherlands in Tables 4. 
 
 
 